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Thursday, July 29, 2010  

Energy Security Revisited: A Catalyst for Multilateral Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific Region and the Role of the U.S. - Japan Alliance

August 29, 2006

Mr. Shoichi Itoh, Researcher, Economic Research Institute for Northeast Asia (ERINA, Niigata, Japan)  
 
Energy security is one of today’s most prevalent issues in East Asian foreign policy discussions. The rapid economic growth of countries such as China and India means rising energy consumption and resource procurement, which can lead to certain strategic moves that might be at odds with the goals of regional neighbors and allies. Energy security is seen by both Japan and the United States as one of the subjects they share great interest in as partners in the region; this summer’s Japan-U.S. Summit Meeting produced a joint communiqué that mentioned the term no less than three times. The Center for Global Partnership has been following these policy debates on energy security with great interest, and has provided funding to a number of institutions tackling the issue from a variety of angles. This June the CGP New York Office held a conference with the East West Institute (New York) and the Economic Research Institute for Northeast Asia (ERINA, Niigata, Japan) entitled “Energy Security in Asia,” a summary of which can be found here. CGP also provided funding to a discussion held in Washington, DC at The Nixon Center on the subject of “US-European-Japanese Dialogue on Energy Security and Climate.” Participating in both conferences was Mr. Shoichi Itoh, a researcher at ERINA whose specialties include energy security and international cooperation in Northeast Asia. The following essay outlines some of the main components of what energy security means in Northeast Asia, and how he feels the current situation should be construed as one of opportunity for cooperation, rather than one of competing interests. CGP hopes that Mr. Itoh’s article is merely the beginning of an ongoing dialogue on energy security in this forum, and we welcome additional comments and perspectives. Please revisit our website for additional pieces on the subject in the future.
  
 
    Tackling the record-breaking oil prices of the past few years has recently become one of the most pressing policy issues in the world, and today the term “energy security” is at the forefront of public discussions. While U.S. energy consumption continues to rise, it is China’s rapid increase in energy demand that is increasingly becoming of particular concern to global energy experts and analysts. According to the International Energy Agency (IEA), China’s demand for oil in 2030 is projected to increase to about 2.5 times as compared to the 2003 level. The Chinese government further predicts that by the year 2020 their net oil imports will be more than double today’s amount. Beijing’s resource diplomacy in the Middle East, Africa, and Latin America has been criticized for including various kinds of financial assistance to non-democratic and problematic regimes such as Iran, Nigeria, and Venezuela, and has sparked debates over the “ominous” nature of Chinese energy security policy. A symbolic event was when the China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC) was obliged to withdraw its bid for the U.S. oil company UNOCAL in June 2005 – the threat of foreign acquisition had inflamed protectionist sentiments in U.S. Congress sentiments. Meanwhile, China and Japan are competing to secure priority access to the future construction of an oil pipeline from East Siberia. 
    At first glance it would appear that energy rivalries are likely to perpetuate a vicious cycle. Furthermore, it is taken for granted that a geopolitical game over energy resources often leads to deepening of mutual distrust and heightened nationalistic criticisms. However, is this true, and is there really no way out? One explanation is that international politics is by its very nature a game of competing misperceptions. Virtually no foreign policy can be a complete set of correct situational awareness between the parties involved. As a matter of fact, quite a few energy experts have indicated that the current trend of explosively rising oil prices has been caused more by financial derivatives transactions than by the tightening balance of demand and supply in the world energy markets.
    For the purpose of dispelling the politicized and often superficial traditional concept of energy security and offering a more flexible interpretation of what energy security really entails, I would like to suggest that we bear in mind three key points in regards to the contemporary “dead heat” energy security disputes.
    Firstly, with regard to the definition of energy security, the different aspects of its meanings should be articulated. A common understanding of the term is maintaining necessary access to energy resources without risking the state’s survival now and in the future. However, another aspect of energy security is reducing energy consumption by improving energy efficiency. The latter variant is often less emphasized in political discourses, but has increasingly become a feasible alternative today due to the advancement of high technology and the possibility of international technology transfers. Therefore, the geopolitical zero-sum implications of energy security can be reduced, as long as energy conservation issues receive more serious public attention and are more positively integrated into not only the domestic, but also the international agenda. Furthermore, energy conservation should be considered not merely for economic benefit, but also more importantly for political reasons. According to some estimates, due to different levels of energy efficiency, China requires about 9-10 times as much energy as Japan per unit of GDP, while the United States needs about twice as much. It can be expected that effective diffusion of Japanese technologies in the energy sector would greatly contribute to reducing the speed of rising energy demands on a global scale. In May 2006, Japan announced that energy-saving and environmental cooperation in Asia would be one of the main pillars of its new National Energy Strategy. In the meantime, the development and promotion of new energy resources and environmental protection has found a place on the national agendas of not only the Unites States, but also China.
    Secondly, intensification of competition among consuming countries leads to a one-sided benefit for supplying countries. Meanwhile, supplying nations attempt to drive wedges between the consuming nations in order to raise oil prices and enjoy procurement of foreign investments under unilaterally favorable conditions in the name of resource nationalism. A case in point is Russia’s energy strategy to destabilize Sino-Japanese relations over the trans-Siberian oil pipeline project. Geologists have long pointed out the possible rich potential of untapped oil and gas under the permafrost terrain of Eastern Russia, at least in theory. From an economic and business viewpoint, however, without the participation of a major Western oil company, the prospects for a reasonable rate of return on investments, and the degree of technological difficulties to overcome before securing a sufficient amount of oil production in the near future, are still largely unknown. In other words, the risks are high for a consuming nation to make major oil investment decisions without either sharing the risks internationally or waiting for a more stabilized legal framework for foreign investment in Russia. It would not be logical for either Tokyo or Beijing to bear the whole burden of possible risks by recklessly expelling the other as a risk-sharing partner. The same logic can be applied to other similar cooperative efforts among consuming countries elsewhere as well.
    Thirdly, United States’ leadership in establishing an energy regime could greatly encourage multilateral cooperation for energy security in the Asia-Pacific region. In the 21st century the Asia-Pacific region is expected to have the world’s highest economic growth rates and corresponding growth in energy demand. However, no effective multilateral regime promoting cooperation over energy security has emerged. Even at the bilateral level, it is surprising that Tokyo and Washington are still lacking a comprehensive joint energy security framework. This is despite the recent transformation and adjustments to the U.S.-Japan alliance, which opened a new page for further consolidation of the partnership. One may assume that Japan’s energy conservation technologies and experiences could be useful for energy security in the future. Unfortunately, while sounding ideal, historically embedded mistrust between the nations of Northeast Asia, especially between Japan and China, has politically hindered implementation of a potential win-win situation in seeking energy security. Nevertheless, mutual awareness of reaching positive-sum results by way of cooperating over energy conservation is gradually growing, even amidst seemingly worsening contemporary Sino-Japanese relations. But the dialogue on energy conservation has been primarily directed towards business opportunities, and has not expanded in any significant way to the political arena nor to addressing the sensitive vocabulary of energy security. It is likely that the Sino-Japanese rivalry cannot escape irrational and emotional competition over such issues as energy without having a mediator with strong leadership, such as the United States. Every university student of international relations learns Stephen Krasner’s classic definition of “regimes:”the principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which actors’ expectations converge in a given issue-area. However, when it comes to building a framework for regional cooperation in the Asia-Pacific, an energy security regime would be difficult to emerge without the United States playing the role of a “shock absorber” between competing states.
    We must overcome the stereotypes and pessimistic understandings of achieving energy security. We need to mitigate today’s crisis atmosphere of a possible escalation of energy competition before reaching an irreversible level of unnecessary conflicts. It is time that we realize the opportunity for cooperation among the Asia-Pacific’s major powers, and also to reconsider the essence of energy security by shedding light on the possibility of win-win scenarios, especially among the consuming countries. The United States and Japan should take responsibility for future generations by taking a dynamic step forward in building an energy security regime in the Asia-Pacific at the earliest stage.
 

 
The views expressed above are those of the author and may not necessarily reflect the views of the organization. 

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