Tackling the record-breaking
oil prices of the past few years has recently become one of the most pressing
policy issues in the world, and today the term “energy security” is at the
forefront of public discussions. While
U.S. energy consumption continues
to rise, it is China’s
rapid increase in energy demand that is increasingly becoming of particular
concern to global energy experts and analysts. According to the International
Energy Agency (IEA), China’s
demand for oil in 2030 is projected to increase to about 2.5 times as compared
to the 2003 level. The Chinese government further predicts that by the year
2020 their net oil imports will be more than double today’s amount. Beijing’s resource
diplomacy in the Middle East, Africa, and Latin America
has been criticized for including various kinds of financial assistance to
non-democratic and problematic regimes such as Iran, Nigeria, and Venezuela, and
has sparked debates over the “ominous” nature of Chinese energy security
policy. A symbolic event was when the China National Offshore Oil Corporation
(CNOOC) was obliged to withdraw its bid for the U.S. oil company UNOCAL in June
2005 – the threat of foreign acquisition had inflamed protectionist sentiments
in U.S. Congress sentiments. Meanwhile, China and Japan are
competing to secure priority access to the future construction of an oil
pipeline from East Siberia.
At first glance it would
appear that energy rivalries are likely to perpetuate a vicious cycle. Furthermore,
it is taken for granted that a geopolitical game over energy resources often
leads to deepening of mutual distrust and heightened nationalistic criticisms.
However, is this true, and is there really no way out? One explanation is that
international politics is by its very nature a game of competing
misperceptions. Virtually no foreign policy can be a complete set of correct
situational awareness between the parties involved. As a matter of fact, quite
a few energy experts have indicated that the current trend of explosively
rising oil prices has been caused more by financial derivatives transactions
than by the tightening balance of demand and supply in the world energy
markets.
For the purpose of
dispelling the politicized and often superficial traditional concept of energy
security and offering a more flexible interpretation of what energy security
really entails, I would like to suggest that we bear in mind three key points
in regards to the contemporary “dead heat” energy security disputes.
Firstly, with regard to
the definition of energy security, the different aspects of its meanings should
be articulated. A common understanding of the term is maintaining necessary
access to energy resources without risking the state’s survival now and in the
future. However, another aspect of energy security is reducing energy
consumption by improving energy efficiency. The latter variant is often less
emphasized in political discourses, but has increasingly become a feasible
alternative today due to the advancement of high technology and the possibility
of international technology transfers. Therefore, the geopolitical zero-sum
implications of energy security can be reduced, as long as energy conservation
issues receive more serious public attention and are more positively integrated
into not only the domestic, but also the international agenda. Furthermore,
energy conservation should be considered not merely for economic benefit, but
also more importantly for political reasons. According to some estimates, due
to different levels of energy efficiency, China requires about 9-10 times as
much energy as Japan
per unit of GDP, while the United
States needs about twice as much. It can be
expected that effective diffusion of Japanese technologies in the energy sector
would greatly contribute to reducing the speed of rising energy demands on a
global scale. In May 2006, Japan
announced that energy-saving and environmental cooperation in Asia
would be one of the main pillars of its new National Energy Strategy. In the
meantime, the development and promotion of new energy resources and
environmental protection has found a place on the national agendas of not only
the Unites States, but also China.
Secondly,
intensification of competition among consuming countries leads to a one-sided
benefit for supplying countries. Meanwhile, supplying nations attempt to drive
wedges between the consuming nations in order to raise oil prices and enjoy
procurement of foreign investments under unilaterally favorable conditions in
the name of resource nationalism. A case in point is Russia’s energy strategy to
destabilize Sino-Japanese relations over the trans-Siberian oil pipeline
project. Geologists have long pointed out the possible rich potential of
untapped oil and gas under the permafrost terrain of Eastern
Russia, at least in theory. From an economic and business
viewpoint, however, without the participation of a major Western oil company,
the prospects for a reasonable rate of return on investments, and the degree of
technological difficulties to overcome before securing a sufficient amount of
oil production in the near future, are still largely unknown. In other words, the
risks are high for a consuming nation to make major oil investment decisions
without either sharing the risks internationally or waiting for a more
stabilized legal framework for foreign investment in Russia. It would not be logical for
either Tokyo or
Beijing to bear
the whole burden of possible risks by recklessly expelling the other as a
risk-sharing partner. The same logic can be applied to other similar
cooperative efforts among consuming countries elsewhere as well.
Thirdly, United States’
leadership in establishing an energy regime could greatly encourage
multilateral cooperation for energy security in the Asia-Pacific region. In the
21st century the Asia-Pacific region is expected to have the world’s highest economic
growth rates and corresponding growth in energy demand. However, no effective
multilateral regime promoting cooperation over energy security has emerged.
Even at the bilateral level, it is surprising that Tokyo and Washington are still lacking a comprehensive
joint energy security framework. This is despite the recent transformation and adjustments
to the U.S.-Japan alliance, which opened a new page for further consolidation
of the partnership. One may assume that Japan’s energy conservation
technologies and experiences could be useful for energy security in the future.
Unfortunately, while sounding ideal, historically embedded mistrust between the
nations of Northeast Asia, especially between Japan and China, has
politically hindered implementation of a potential win-win situation in seeking
energy security. Nevertheless, mutual awareness of reaching positive-sum
results by way of cooperating over energy conservation is gradually growing,
even amidst seemingly worsening contemporary Sino-Japanese relations. But the
dialogue on energy conservation has been primarily directed towards business
opportunities, and has not expanded in any significant way to the political
arena nor to addressing the sensitive vocabulary of energy security. It is
likely that the Sino-Japanese rivalry cannot escape irrational and emotional
competition over such issues as energy without having a mediator with strong
leadership, such as the United
States. Every university student of
international relations learns Stephen Krasner’s classic definition of “regimes:”the
principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which actors’
expectations converge in a given issue-area. However, when it comes to building
a framework for regional cooperation in the Asia-Pacific, an energy security
regime would be difficult to emerge without the United States playing the role of a
“shock absorber” between competing states.
We
must overcome the stereotypes and pessimistic understandings of achieving
energy security. We need to mitigate today’s crisis atmosphere of a possible escalation
of energy competition before reaching an irreversible level of unnecessary
conflicts. It is time that we realize the opportunity for cooperation among the
Asia-Pacific’s major powers, and also to reconsider the essence of energy
security by shedding light on the possibility of win-win scenarios, especially
among the consuming countries. The United States and Japan should
take responsibility for future generations by taking a dynamic step forward in
building an energy security regime in the Asia-Pacific at the earliest stage.