 The
story of philanthropy's role in international relations remains largely
untold. Considerable attention has been paid in recent years,
particularly in the wake of the war in Iraq, to how the American
occupation of Japan helped overcome the animosity of wartime to build
strong ties between the victor and the vanquished, the United States
and Japan. Yet American philanthropists and their partners on both
sides of the Pacific played a similarly critical, and altogether
indispensable, role in laying the foundation for Japanese and American
friendship in the postwar era.
Soon after the end of the war, a handful of internationally minded
U.S. foundations and philanthropists set out to restore and strengthen
the U.S.-Japan relationship.* Although the monetary value of their
investment over the next 30 years might be considered modest by current
standards - approximately $55-60 million through roughly 4,000 grants - they
succeeded in nurturing a web of linkages between various sectors of
both societies that have been instrumental in helping sustain close and
resilient bilateral relations for more than half a century.
The ways in which they contributed to the rebuilding of U.S.-Japan
relations have been the subject of a three-year study coordinated by
the Japan Center for International Exchange (JCIE). Headed by Kobe
University professor Makoto Iokibe, Harvard University historian Akira
Iriye, and JCIE president Tadashi Yamamoto, the research team has drawn
on interviews and extensive archival research to piece together a
picture of Japan-related foundation activities during the period from
1945 to 1975. The findings will be published in the late spring as an
edited volume, tentatively titled From Enemies to Allies: The Role of Philanthropy in Rebuilding Postwar U.S.-Japan Relations, 1945−75.
This has been made possible by generous support from a consortium of
funders including the Japan Foundation Center for Global Partnership
and nine other American and Japanese foundations.
In the immediate postwar era, at a time when the prevailing
tendency was simply to transplant American ideals and ideas to Japan,
John D. Rockefeller 3rd (JDR 3rd) and other members of the small group
of Americans involved in Japan-related philanthropy recognized that, to
stand the test of time, the U.S.-Japan relationship would have to be
built upon a foundation of mutual understanding and that its strength
would depend on the ability to maintain a discourse on the state of the
relationship and where it was heading. Therefore, it was important to
ground their undertakings in a sense of equality and mutual respect.
They often bent over backwards to ensure that projects were driven by
Japanese organizers, not American funders or partner organizations, and
that leadership came from the Japanese side. Meanwhile, they benefited
from the surprisingly strong prewar tradition of philanthropic activity
among Japanese industrialists and corporations. Their support was often
matched by Japanese funding - despite widespread economic hardship in
Japan - and the preexisting networks among various elites proved
essential to the success of many of their initiatives.
Practically all of these foundation officials had served in
government posts at some point, but they were convinced that there was
an indispensable role for independent, nongovernmental leadership in
helping to build and maintain relations between the two countries.
While they shared a common set of values and long-term goals - including
democratization, anticommunism, and internationalism - with American
policymakers, they calculated that private initiatives, unencumbered by
perceptions of governmental control, had a unique capacity to reach out
to moderate elements of the left, engage a broad range of public
intellectuals in dialogue, and promote interaction that could not be
easily dismissed as propaganda. They fervently believed, as one Ford
Foundation official put it in a 1962 memo," a foundation can contribute
in some areas even more effectively than the government to the
restoration of what Ambassador Reischauer has called the 'broken
dialogue.'"
Generally speaking, the support of the major U.S. foundations and
philanthropists was not for relief or the reconstruction of Japan's
infrastructure, but rather to strengthen the nongovernmental
underpinnings of the relationship. Beginning soon after the close of
World War II, the core players - first the Rockefeller Foundation and JDR
3rd, and then the Asia Foundation and the Ford Foundation - focused
strategically on the various elements that could promote mutual
understanding and dialogue among Americans and Japanese.
Much of their attention was on developing professional expertise
on each other's country, primarily by strengthening university training
in area studies. Nearly one-third of total foundation funding, close to
$18 million, went to support Japanese studies. Although U.S. government
funding was flowing into the field during much of the period, often
dwarfing the amount of foundation money, the capacity of private
funding to be apportioned in a focused, innovative, and flexible
manner - for example, to set up new area studies centers at key American
universities - allowed it to play an outsized role in shaping the field
and leading the way for government funding.
Meanwhile, they used an additional $2.3−2.4 million to help
develop American studies at Japanese universities. This, too, played a
critical catalytic role, encouraging independent and enterprising
individuals and helping launch several of the central institutions in
the discipline. In these politically charged times, private funding was
crucial for another reason as well. As Ford Foundation consultant
Herbert Passin argued in a 1964 planning memo, it was needed to "remove
the taint of cultural imperialism and make the field more respectable"
by watering down the association of American studies with the U.S.
government, which was the only other major alternative source of
funding through most of the period.
Person-to-person exchange was seen as another pillar of the
relationship, and foundation officials, especially at the Asia
Foundation, sought to encourage this through scores of small grants to
local exchange organizations as well as through support for individuals
so that they could travel and study abroad. Their hope was to expose
leaders from all walks of life in Japan and the United States to one
another and, through this, to encourage deeper understanding and the
formation of networks of likeminded individuals. Of course, some of the
funding in Japan, particularly in the early years, was clearly designed
to combat the spread of communist ideology and anti-American
sentiments, but on a deeper level much of it seemed to be tied to a
sort of "missionary quest for individual conversion" based on the
conviction that were fair-minded people to have contact with the United
States, they would naturally come to respect and admire the American
way of life.
Foundation officials were particularly interested in promoting
intellectual dialogue between leaders from politics, business, media,
academia, and other sectors of society. A key goal was to promote
intellectual engagement, not just between Japan and the United States,
but also Japanese engagement with the rest of the world. Much of this
intellectual dialogue was policy oriented in nature, and it involved
bilateral and multilateral conferences such as the Ford
Foundation−funded Dartmouth Roundtable and Shimoda Conference, numerous
joint research studies, and various exchange and dialogue programs that
sought to build networks among leaders. Even though they included
government leaders, these projects were most effective in promoting
free and frank exchanges when convened by nongovernmental organizations
perceived as having a degree of neutrality and often possible only with
the political cover provided by private funding.
Lastly, special attention was paid to creating and strengthening
institutions that would serve as bases for intellectual and grassroots
exchange between Japan and the United States. In the 1950s, JDR 3rd led
the way by orchestrating the revival of the Japan Society of New York
and arranging funding for the creation of the International House of
Japan, in both cases to help coordinate exchange at the national level.
Later, in the 1960s and 1970s, the Ford Foundation and others played
key roles in nurturing organizations such as Saburo Okita's Japan
Economic Research Center, JCIE, and the Trilateral Commission, all of
which helped develop intellectual networks and encourage Japan's
intellectual engagement with the outside world. In particular, the
foundations recognized and nurtured what might be called indigenous
"nonprofit entrepreneurs," people who had the vision, skills, and
tenacity to create sustainable institutions.
Of course, the foundations and philanthropists active in
U.S.-Japan relations in the early postwar era had their share of false
starts and failures. They pushed ahead with some projects without
sufficient local support, they often underestimated the time and
commitment needed to bring real change, and their nongovernmental
status never completely insulated them from periodic accusations that
they were mouthpieces of U.S. government policy. Nevertheless, their
strategy paid off in the long run. By actively working to strengthen
the various underpinnings that tie the two countries together, they
clearly played a key role in helping to build the strong relationship
that we enjoy today.
* It truly was a small number of foundations and philanthropists
that were active in the field during the three decades that are the
focus of the study. The Rockefeller Foundation and the Carnegie
Corporation of New York both began working on Asia in the prewar
period, and the Asia Foundation, the Ford Foundation, and John D.
Rockefeller 3rd and his various foundations emerged to play key roles
in the postwar era. Later, in the 1970s, a handful of new players
appeared on the scene, including the Andrew W. Mellon Foundation, the
Rockefeller Brothers Fund, and, from 1972, the Japan Foundation.
The views expressed above are those of the author and may not necessarily reflect the views of the organization. |
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| "...to stand the test of time, the US-Japan relationship would have to be built upon a foundation of mutual understanding and that its strength would depend on the ability to maintain a discourse on the state of the relationship and where it was heading." |
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